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Abstract: Cloud computing brings eﬃciency improvement on resource utilization
and other beneﬁts such as on-demand service provisioning, location independence and
ubiquitous access, elastic resource pooling, pay as usage pricing mode, etc. However,
it also introduces new security issues because the data management and ownership
are separated, and the management is operated on a virtualized platform. In this pa-
per, a novel dynamic secure interconnection (DSI) mechanism is proposed to isolate
the cloud computing system into a couple of dynamic virtual trust zones with diﬀer-
ent security policies implemented for diﬀerent customers so as to enhance security.
Experimental results are presented to demonstrate the feasibility and eﬀectiveness of
the DSI mechanism.
Keywords: Cloud Computing, virtualization management, security, dynamic secure
interconnection
1 Introduction
In recent years, cloud computing is drawing more and more attention with its capabilities
of eﬃcient resource utilization, virtual machine live migration and multi-tenancy operational
mode. Virtualization is the fundamental technology for both public and private cloud, virtual
machine is expected to be dynamically allocated according to the requirements of customers, to
be seamlessly migrated from one physical machine to another, and to be managed appropriately
to prevent illegal access. However, cloud computing brings unprecedented challenges on security
issues. As long as customers upload their sensitive data into a cloud computing system, the
cloud computing service provider (CSP) is responsible for managing the data. Customers will
lose the control of the data, who is using them, and when it is deleted.
And in a cloud computing environment, virtualization cannot be protected by conventional
network security solution, such as Ą°security zoneĄą separation, ﬁrewall, VPN, intrusion detec-
tion/prevention system, anti-DDoS solution, deep packet inspection technology [1].
In this paper, we propose a security enhanced virtual machine management mechanism named
dynamic secure interconnection (DSI) for cloud computing system. A Ą°dynamic virtual trust
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zonesĄą is established to enhance information and virtualization security. In section 2, back-
grounds about the cloud computing and virtualization security issues are reviewed. Section 3
provides a typical cloud computing model and states the typical security problems and require-
ments, and Section 4 proposes the DSI mechanism and operational procedure in details. A
testbed and some experimental results are presented in Section 5. The paper is concluded in
Section 6.
2 Related Work
The security issues are the major concerns for enterprise to adopt cloud computing [2] [3]
[4]. Seven cloud computing security risks are identiﬁed by Gartner [5], i.e. privileged use access,
regulatory compliance, data location, data segregation, recovery, investigation support, long-term
viability. The root cause of these security risks is data storage, management and computation
are performed on a shared and virtualized environment.
Since VMs work over hypervisor, malicious VMs cannot gain access to other VMs or launch
cross-VM attacks when security countermeasures are implemented on hypervisors. However, this
security boundary can be broken and malicious VMs can get full access to the physical host so
as to get access to other VMs located on the same host illegally [6] [7]. Virtualization security
has been studied from many aspects. In [8], an out-of-VM monitoring mechanism is proposed
by using a trust VM to monitor the statues of guest VMs which deliver services to customers.
The solution assumes the trust VM can prevent a variety of security threats. However, there
is a large performance overhead associated with this solution when traﬃc is switched between
the guest VMs and the trust VM. In order to provide a trusted VM on untrusted computing
OS, a secure virtualization architecture is proposed to provide a secure execution environment
[9]. The architecture includes a secure run-time environment, secure network interface and a
secure secondary storage. Apart from the secure architecture, trust platform module has be used
to establish the root of trust for VMs [10]. In [11], a virtual layer management framework is
presented to ensure that cloud providers properly isolate VMs that run in the same physical
platform, a cloud computing system is divided into a number of domains on the virtualization
layer. Corresponding protocols are also proposed to manage the domain creation, interaction and
termination. The interaction among the domains is based on secure channels [12] to establish
trustworthy self-management foundation.
Data protection is another critical issue. Service providers such as Foursquare which provides
a location based service and Reddit which supplies social news voting services use Amazon
EC2 (Elastic Cloud Computing platform). In 2011, the crash of Amazon EC2 service takes
down the service of Foursquare, Reddit, Cydia, Discovr and Scvngr [13]. Also, application
(software) service provider can only rely on the infrastructure service provider to ensure the
business continuity under the umbrella of SLA (service level agreement). They can implement
their own security policies to achieve data security, preventing data loss or leakage. In [14],
Hwang and Li propose a data coloring and software watermarking technique to establish trust
among cloud service providers. In particular, if data objects and software modules are shared
over multiple data centres, the trust-overlay network can establish a reputation system to protect
data security and integrity.
Cloud privacy is to ensure the personal or sensitive information only be accessed by intended
and authorized person or applications. The privacy issue originates from the lack of user ac-
cess control and information transparency. That is when adopting a cloud storage service, e.g.
the Dropbox [15], the customers are diﬃcult to implement mechanisms to protect their infor-
mation from unauthorized access or misuses. Promising privacy preservation solutions include
minimizing personal information stored in the cloud, maximizing use control, allowing user to
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choose, specify and limit the data usage [16]. In addition, data encryption is always a popular
way, despite the extra overhead and complexity resulting from encryption algorithms and key
management issues. In [17], a data secure sharing mechanism is proposed to enforce data access
control, strengthening data encryption and improving the key sharing process when cloud cus-
tomers store their data in a public cloud platform. The solution can protect the cloud storage
providers from unauthorized access, ensuring data conﬁdentiality and privacy. In [18], a privacy-
preserving public auditing supported secure cloud storage system is proposed, which enables that
data privacy of cloud storage to be publicly audited by a third party auditor. In particular, the
homomorphic liner authenticator and random masking techniques are utilized to guarantee that
the third party auditor would not learn any knowledge about the data content stored on the
cloud server during the auditing process.
3 Problem Description
A number of open source cloud computing platform is based on the policies conﬁgured such
as user authentication, authorization and accounting, VM allocation, drifting and state manage-
ment, host machine management, service provision management. In the model, the security issues
become much more complicated. First, the conventional network security solutions become less
eﬀective since they are usually deployed at the edge of a physical network to control and protect
the incoming or outgoing traﬃc of a LAN. Second, new virtualization security countermeasures
should be implemented on the virtualized perimeters where the physical network perimeter does
not exist. Third, in the multi-tenancy environment, customers who share the same local network
should have logically or physically separated computing, storage and networking resources, espe-
cially when customers come from diﬀerent enterprises. That means cloud service provider should
allocate each customer and their resources within a same virtualized trust group, permitting the
interconnection within the same group and control the communication among diﬀerent groups.
Finally, when customers are on travel, the VMs related to them will be drifted and migrated
from one physical machine to another, the security policies that implemented by the customer
and on related VMs are expected to move along with migration.
4 Dynamic Secure Interconnection Mechanism
In this section, a novel mechanism, DSI-VM management mechanism is proposed to enhance
security in a cloud computing system. A new concept of Ą°virtual trust zoneĄą is also introduced.
4.1 Deﬁnitions and Assumptions
Virtual Trust Zone: VMs are the basic operation unit to implement management and
security policies. When customers login and get service from a cloud computing system, they
are allocated with virtualized resources in terms of VMs according to their requirements. VMs
that assigned to the same customer should be aggregated in a same group and implemented with
the uniﬁed management and security policies. Thus, the VMs that stay in the same group have
basic trust among each other, and this group is deﬁned as a Ą°virtual trust zoneĄą.
Virtual Bridge:VMs that operate over a physical machine share the same physical MAC
and IP addresses when the physical machine have only one NIC card. Each VM has its own
virtual MAC and virtual IP addresses. A virtual bridge is a function module implemented on
the hypervisor. It forwards packets with virtual MAC and IP address to their destination. A
virtual bridge can serve all VMs on a hypervisor as well as a single VM.
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4.2 The DSI Components
The DSI components include a DSI server, several virtual bridges and DSI clients. The DSI
server works at a centralized mode while virtual bridge and DSI clients works at a peer-to-peer
mode.
Figure 1: Overview of Dynamic Secure Interconnection Mechanism
DSI Server
The DSI server is the central controller for handling the management and security policies.
When a VM is initialized, it is connected with the DSI server to register and start to operate
in the system. When the VM state changes, e.g. suspend, restart, drift or phase out, it will
inform DSI server to update the VM state. Thus, the DSI server maintains all VM properties
and states, such as the virtual MAC (vMAC) and virtual IP (vIP) addresses of VMs, the VM
owner, the corresponding virtual bridge, the real-time VM state, etc.
In addition, DSI server maintains the VM communication protocols, policies and activities.
If VMs stay within a same local network, they can talk with each other using vMAC and vIP.
If VMs stay in diﬀerent local network, especially behind NAT devices, vIP based tunnels will be
established to connect VMs. Meanwhile, appropriate traﬃc control policies will be implemented
during the connection bootstrapping stage, such as encryption algorithms, key management
protocol and traﬃc redirection.
DSI client and virtual bridge
The DSI clients are a large number of VMs. The properties of each DSI client includes vMAC
and vIP addresses, VM state, VM owner, corresponding virtual bridge, host and its own virtual
trust zone ID. Virtual bridges are in charge of performing and implementing the communication
protocols and policies. The communication between two DSI clients is performed at a peer-to-
peer mode. As shown in the Fig. 1, virtual bridge 1 and 5 can establish a direct connection
between VM 1 and VM 9 based on virtual MAC addresses since they belong to the same local
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network and can communicate with each other via vMAC and vIP. However, virtual bridge 1
and 9 have to establish VPN tunnels to transit through the NAT device based on the vIP to
connect VM 1 and VM 17.
4.3 DSI Operation
The DSI operation refers to the interactions among DSI server, several DSI clients and virtual
bridges. More speciﬁcally, the system administrator speciﬁes the management policy on the DSI
server, which then allocates the corresponding communication control policies to individual vir-
tual bridges. Virtual bridges control the communication among DSI clients by relaying, blocking
or rate-limiting packets to establish virtual trust zones.
Policy Conﬁguration
The system management and security policies are conﬁgured on the DSI server according
to the administrative requirements. That includes the DSI client initialization procedures, DSI
client state change procedures, virtual bridge switching protocols and some other traﬃc manage-
ment and security protection policies such as client registration, VM state management, access
control, network isolation, transmission encryption, traﬃc redirection, etc.
Client Initialization and State Maintenance
A new user registration or additional resource request from existing users will incur the
creation of VMs (DSI clients). This process is managed by the cloud computing platform based
on policies such as load balancing, energy eﬃciency. After that, the newly generated VMs (DSI
clients) will be registered on the DSI server, and provide the DSI server with information such
as vMAC and vIP addresses, virtual bridge, VM owner and host machine name. Then the
DSI server instructs the DSI clients and corresponding virtual bridges to perform bootstrapping
process. That includes the notiﬁcation of virtual trust zone ID, other clients within the same
virtual trust zone, communication protocols and policies.
When the VMs (DSI clients) start to change their states, e.g. suspended, drifted or termi-
nated, the DSI server will be notiﬁed with the change. The related communication protocols
and policies will then be updated by the DSI server and reconﬁgured on each virtual bridge.
For example, the VM 1 and VM 2 are suspended when their owners travel to other cities. The
VMs are drifted and migrated into another data centre and will be allocated on virtual bridge
11 and 12 respectively, with their previous virtual MAC and IP addresses inherited. Previous
and existing virtual bridges (virtual bridge 1, 11 and 12) will then report DSI server about the
update and new tenant. DSI server will then update the related information in all virtual bridges
to make sure the drifted VM 1 and drifted VM 2 can be connected seamlessly.
Virtual Bridge Communication Management
Virtual bridge is responsible for managing VM interconnection, traﬃc ﬂow and virtual net-
work topology. In Fig. 1, the VM 1 and VM 2 reside on the same virtual bridge 1 and serve
the same customer. Thus, by allowing the interconnection between the VM 1 and VM 2, these
two DSI clients are allocated into a same virtual trust zone. On the other hand, if VM 1 and
VM 3 are serving customers from diﬀerent enterprises, the interconnection between them will
be blocked by virtual bridge 1 and 2. Thus, the VM 1 and VM 3 are regarded as staying in
diﬀerent virtual trust zone. Virtual bridges conﬁgure and maintain ACL (access control list) to
authenticate vMAC addresses to start interconnection between DSI clients. Therefore, vMAC
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based communication management is more suitable between VMs within the same local network
where the virtual MAC addresses can be recognized.
If the two clients stay in diﬀerent networks or behind NAT devices, the vIP address of a DSI
client registered on the DSI server may be meaningless for another DSI client. The virtual IP
addresses based tunnelling among VMs is performed by establishing peer-to-peer tunnels between
virtual bridges, e.g. VM 1 and VM 17 in Fig. 1. The DSI server conﬁgures the virtual bridges to
create tunnels with proper parameters such as the vIP address of the destination, the tunnelling
protocols and encapsulation options. By doing that, access control and virtual network isolation
can be further extended between VMs that stay in diﬀerent local network.
4.4 Security
The dynamic security interconnection mechanism enhances cloud computing security by im-
plementing access control mechanisms among VMs. In particular, virtual trust zones can be
established by building the tunnels among virtual bridges.
Virtual Trust Zone Establishment
A virtual trust zone is a group of DSI clients (VMs) that interconnected by virtual bridges
with some interconnection policies. A DSI client (e.g. VM 1) will be generated when a customer
ﬁrst login the system and request for computing and storage resources. When the customer
requests for additional resources, a virtual trust zone is established to include the newly gen-
erated DSI client and the original one. The clients are trusted with each other and thus the
interconnection between them is permitted. When the newly generated clients share the same
physical host (e.g. VM 2) or local network (e.g. VM 9) with the original client, the virtual MAC
address based access control mechanism and corresponding policies are implemented. If a new
client resides in a remote data centre (e.g. VM 17), the IP tunnels based interconnection will be
implemented. The IP tunnels based interconnection is also operational between VMs within a
data centre (e.g. between VM 1 and VM 9). The virtual bridges will select the light-weighted
vMAC based protocol in order to reduce the operation overhead and the management complexity
of IP tunnelling protocol.
Encrypted Tunnel Establishment
When the customer travels from one city to another, the drifted DSI clients (e.g. VM 1 and
VM 2) will migrate into a diﬀerent network. The communication within a virtual trust zone,
e.g. between the drifted VM 1 and VM 9, may go through an insecure public network. The
encrypted tunnel will be established to protect the information exchange against various attacks
such as eavesdropping. The DSI server may provide additional information to facilitate tunnel
setup authentication, e.g. the certiﬁcate ﬁngerprint [19]. In that case, DSI server presents an
IKE/IPsec tunnel for NAT traversal, e.g. the UDP encapsulation of IPsec tunnelling [20].
Traﬃc Redirection
The virtual bridges can redirect the outgoing traﬃc of VMs to a dedicated traﬃc analysis
and cleaning device before relaying them to their destination when the customers require them
or when the system is under attacks. The dedicated device may be a secure VM or conventional
security system such as anti-DDoS solution [1]. As an example in Fig. 1, the traﬃc from VM 11
and VM 12 are redirected to a traﬃc cleaning centre before it is forwarded to their destination,
VM 13 and VM 14. The cost of this kind of security solution is performance degradation and
operation overhead.
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Security Policy Consistency
Since the network is separated into several virtual trust zones, security countermeasures can
be implemented on a per-trust-zone basis. When the VMs in a virtual trust zone migrated from
one host to another, e.g. VM 1 and 2, virtual bridge 1, 11 and 12 will then update DSI server
about this information. And the DSI server will then reconﬁgure the tunnels among the virtual
bridges accordingly. As a result, DSI server maintains the information about the dynamic trust
zone no matter where the VMs migrate. The security policies can also be shifted along with the
VM movement.
Comparison and Discussion
With the DSI mechanism, the traﬃc among VMs in the same trust zone is permitted while
the traﬃc among VMs in diﬀerent trust zones is controlled. Thus the trust zones are separated
by simply managing the interconnection among VMs. This mechanism has several advantages.
• First, compared with the virtual layer management framework proposed in [11], our solution
is relatively simple. In [11], several domains and complicated management mechanisms are
introduced to manage the virtual layer. The DSI maintains virtual trust zones based only
on the interconnection control mechanism.
• Second, DSI is very practical to make full use of all existing protocols, hypervisors and
platforms to ensure the compatibility with most of existing cloud computing system.
5 Testbed and Experiment Results
A proof-of-concept testbed is constructed for demonstration of the DSI mechanism,and a
simple Cloud computing platform named Ą°VM Management platformĄą is implemented to
perform the virtualized resource management, as shown in Fig.2.
Conﬁgurations. Libvirt toolkit and its virtualization APIs are utilized to construct the
platform based on hypervisors of KVM, Xen Server or Virtual Box. Several VM management
functionalities and policies are established written by C programs. VM initialization policies
include VM instant created on host whose CPU/RAM is most idle; VM instant created on hosts
already power on as far as possible; VM instant created on all hosts in average. Apart from that,
VM management policies also include the VM suspend, migration, error control and disaster
recovery policies. The VM management platform manages all VMs on host 2, 3 and 4.
Hardware settings. The testbed is composed of a Cisco Catalyst 2960PD-8TT-L switch
and four PCs, host 1 is used for management, host 2, 3 and 4 are used for resource provision.
Each PCs has a Intel CORE i5 four core 3.3GHz CPU, 4G RAM and 320G hard disk, and is
able to accommodate 4 VMs. On host 1, 2, 3 and 4, hypervisor is installed on Linux Redhat
Enterprise 5.6. In the experiment, three typical open source hypervisors of KVM, Xen Server and
Virtual Box are selected to operate on the OS. The KVM and Virtual Box are type 2 hypervisors,
while the Xen Server belongs to the type 1.
Virtual bridge functionality is implemented on host 2, 3, and 4. It is enabled based on the
tun/tap device of Linux. Apart from switching, protocols of traﬃc ﬁltering, traﬃc redirection,
tunnel establishment are achieved by a set of C programs. The DSI server functionality is enabled
by running a set of C program on the OS of host 1. The DSI functionalities include a management
user interface (UI) and maintenance on DSI client information database.
In the experiment, the DSI mechanism operates normally on each of the three hypervisors,
no matter whether it is type 1 or type 2. First, four VMs are conﬁgured on host 2, four on host
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Figure 2: Testbed and Experiment
3 and IP addresses are assigned from 10.0.0.1 to 10.0.0.8. VM 1, 2, 5, 6 are conﬁgured in the
same virtual trust zone and VM 3, 4, 7, 8 in the same zone. That can be achieved by permitting
the interconnection between virtual bridge 1 and 3, and between virtual bridge 2 and 4. Ping
command is used to check the interconnection control within and among virtual trust zones. The
Ą°pingĄą between VM 1 and 5 is successful and between VM 1 to 3 is failed. In the second test
case, VM 1 drifts from host 2 to 4, the virtual bridges on hosts inform the DSI server about this
change, and DSI server updates the DSI client information database and informs related virtual
bridge to update their interconnection conﬁguration accordingly. In the test, the database is
updated as expected. The Ą°pingĄą command from drifted VM 1 to VM 5 and 3 get the same
result with the ﬁrst test case. It is shown that the drifted VMs still stay within the same virtual
trust zone and security policies keep the same after the migration.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, dynamic secure interconnection (DSI) mechanism is proposed, analyzed and
tested. By managing the VM interconnection and traﬃc direction of a cloud computing system,
the virtualized network can be isolated into a couple of virtual trust zones. Direct connection
within the same zone is established regardless the VM location while the traﬃc among diﬀerent
virtual trust zones will be carefully controlled. Coped with corresponding security service level
agreement, security can be enhanced for customers to adopt cloud computing platform. Our
proposed mechanism can protect sensitive data and information against various attacks such as
eavesdropping to enhance cloud computing security.
As stated in section 4.4, traﬃc redirection is an important security feature of the DSI mecha-
nism. It can release the working load of traﬃc scanning and monitoring on VMs and potentially
facilitate the deployment of conventional security mechanisms such as anti-DDoS, virus, malware
systems. However, this solution may consume extra amount of bandwidth when the traﬃc is
redirected to a monitoring centre. More studies on this issue will be conducted in the future. In
addition, the testbed with the VM management functionality is currently implemented only for
concept proof, so a real-life cloud computing platform will be established by using open source
tools such as Openstack or Eucalyptus to create more practical scenarios. Furthermore, our cur-
rent experiments only selected some primary open source hypervisors to prove the compatibility
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of the DSI mechanism, and the future experiments will involve more commercial hypervisors
such as VMware or Hyper-V. DSI performance comparison on type 1 and type 2 hypervisors will
also be studied.
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